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More than just a Single Market: 
European Integration, Peace and Security in the 1980s 
 
It is tempting to see the 1980s as the decade where the economic underpinnings 
of European integration were most self-evident.  Central to the disagreements of 
the first part of the decade, after all, was that most narrow of squabbles about 
money, namely the dispute over the British budgetary contribution.  Similarly, 
the wider impasse over the finances of the Community centred on calculations of 
economic self-interest on the part of the member states, rather than on lofty 
political ambitions.  The same was also true of the two other dominant internal 
disputes of the period, the quest to regain an element of control over 
expenditure on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and French obstruction of 
Iberian membership.  And if economic self-interest lay at the heart of the four 
years of internal bickering with which the decade began, it was equally 
prominent in the revival of Community fortunes from 1984-5 onwards.  The core 
project around which Community Europe seemed to rediscover the dynamism 
and élan that had proved elusive ever since the 1960s, was fundamentally 
economic, the establishment of a Single Market by 1992.  The winning formula 
turned out to be a return to an updated version of the economic agenda that had 
proved so effective during the Community’s first decade or so of operation.  
Flanking this new central objective, was a crucial push to resolve the budgetary 
deadlock, first with the series of agreements on the British rebate and CAP 
financing agreed at the Fontainebleau Council of June 1984, and then, more 
boldly, with the so-called Delors I budgetary package of 1988.  And by the 
decade’s end, the very success of this economic focused revival had led to 
renewed ambitions to attain another primarily economic target, economic and 
monetary union (EMU), the push for which would come to dominate the EC/EU’s 
fortunes throughout the ensuing quarter of a century.  Bill Clinton’s famous if 
unofficial campaign slogan, from the 1992 presidential election, ‘It’s the 
economy, stupid’, seemed an equally good answer to the question of what drove 
the European integration process throughout the 1980s. 
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 Such a conclusion would also suggest that by the 1980s it was 
increasingly implausible to talk about the integration process being centrally 
connected to the promotion of peace and the avoidance of war.  The profit 
motive, rather than the quest for peace appeared to be its core driver.  It was 
perhaps no coincidence that by the decade’s end, the very idea that quest for 
European unity had ever been driven mainly by the peace motive was under 
sustained historiographical attack by revisionist historians like Alan 
Milward.(Milward, 1984; Milward and Brennan, 1994)  If there were question 
marks over whether building Europe had ever been an endeavour connected to 
the avoidance of renewed European war, how much more convincing was such 
scepticism when applied to a decade like the 1980s when virtually all that the 
European Community did seemed motivated by, and fixated upon, maximising 
European growth rates and promoting prosperity?  And this was all the more so, 
given that the 1980s was the first postwar decade when most countries in 
Western Europe were ruled by leaders who had not experienced combat in 
either World War (French President, François Mitterrand being the principal 
exception.)  As the memory and shadow of the Second World War receded, so too 
did the importance of the promotion of peace as a motivation for the integration 
process. 
 This article, however, will suggest that even during this seemingly 
unpromising period of European integration history for those seeking to 
demonstrate a linkage between quest for peace and that for unity, important 
aspects of the peace motive remained strong.  These were most apparent, in the 
early part of the decade, in the enduring appeal of European cooperation to those 
European leaders frustrated by their relative marginalisation and powerlessness 
in international level discussions of peace and security, whether regarding East-
West relations or the Middle East.  To many Western European politicians, 
integration and the coordination of European foreign policies could be a means 
of exercising influence over international negotiations from which they would 
otherwise be excluded.  In the central years of the decade, meanwhile, the 
promotion of intra-European peace remained at the heart of the rhetoric, the 
symbolism, and the international acceptability of Europe’s most important 
political partnership, that between France and Germany.  Given the centrality of 
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collaboration between these two countries in Europe’s revival during the course 
of the 1980s, this in itself suggests that the peace motive had not faded from 
view altogether.  At the very end of the decade, it will be argued that the 
diplomacy of German unification offers a degree of vindication of those who had 
maintained that integration could contribute to the preservation of peace and 
stability.  The peaceful manner in which Germany regained its position as 
Western Europe’s largest state, highlighted the continent’s ability to withstand a 
potential shock of great magnitude without experiencing the type of 
disintegrative forces that had twice triggered global conflict in the first half of the 
twentieth century.   And finally it will be suggested that both in the early 1980s, 
and again towards the end of the decade, there were signs of the Community’s 
ability, witting and unwitting, to promote democracy in its ‘near abroad’.  In the 
case of Greece, Spain and Portugal, all of which were engaged in a process of 
seeking Community membership as the decade began, the effort to stabilise the 
three countries’ fledgling democracies was quite conscious and involved a 
coalition of civil society actors, many of the individual member states, and the 
European institutions.  For Eastern Europe, by contrast, deliberate engagement 
only began belatedly at the very end of the decade, but the Community’s 
gravitational pull had arguably started exercising an influence some time before.  
This too would suggest that even in the 1980s, European integration was more 
than a purely economic experiment, but instead an exercise that was still seen by 
many of its protagonists as having a much wider impact, including political 
stabilisation and the consolidation of peace within Western Europe. 
 
Economic impasse 
It is certainly the case that a great deal of the impasse that characterised 
European integration in the early 1980s centred on economic issues.  This 
applies to the debilitating and immensely time-consuming row over Britain’s 
budgetary contribution to the Community – an issue that dominated a succession 
of European Council meetings from 1979 through to 1984 obstructing progress 
elsewhere. (Wall, 2008, pp. 5-40; Ludlow, 2016, pp. 207–224).  It also true of the 
wider budgetary dispute by which the Community was beset in this period, a 
row which revolved around the question of whether the Community would or 
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should exceed a ceiling on its total expenditure set at 1% of Community GNP. 
(Bussière et al., 2014, pp. 249–253)  Economics was at the centre of the related 
disagreement over run-away expenditure on the CAP, a burden that a times in 
the early 1980s threatened to overwhelm the Community budget.(Bussière et al., 
2014, pp. 322–323)  And economic considerations lay at the heart of the 
deadlock over the Community’s membership negotiations with Spain and 
Portugal.  The blocking by France of advance towards Iberian membership, a 
policy first signalled by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in a speech delivered 
to French farmers in June 1980, was largely attributable to anxiety within the 
French agricultural sector about possible competition from Spain in particular. 
(Trouvé, 2008, p. 333) Had The Economist’s notorious prediction of the 
Community’s imminent demise in March, 1982 been accurate, many of the 
ailments that had led to its death would indeed have been attributable to 
economic factors. (The Economist, March 29, 1982) 
This state of affairs was not something that Europe’s political class was 
content with, however.  Nor were the solutions to the deadlock viewed as purely 
economic.  The Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet’s complaint that 
Margaret Thatcher was acting like a ‘fille d’épicier’, a ‘grocer’s daughter’ in her 
campaign to get her money back was undoubtedly snobbish, and probably 
sexist.(Jenkins, 1989, p. 529)   But it also reflected a widely shared belief that 
Europe should be about more than ‘pounds, shillings and pence’; a process 
further-reaching than pure calculations of narrow economic self-interest.  Such 
aspirations to transcend the impasse over how much each member state paid 
into the common coffers are also apparent in many of the European reform 
attempts of the early 1980s.  Initiatives like the 1981 Genscher-Colombo plan did 
not seek to resolve economic squabbles simply through economic means; instead 
the hope was to revitalise the integration process in part through institutional 
reform and partly through a reassertion of its political worth.  In particular, the 
Italian and German foreign ministers who put forward the plan hoped to bolster 
the impact of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process, Europe’s 
mechanism for coordinating the foreign policies of its member states, thereby 
highlighting how much could be gained from Europe speaking with a single voice 
on global affairs.  (Bonvincini, 1989) Similarly the Stuttgart Declaration of 1983 
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sought to expand the scope of European foreign policy cooperation, specifically 
referring to ‘security’ as a field in which joint European action was permissible 
for the first time. (Bonvincini, 1989) Once more, therefore, an important part of 
the solution to Europe’s economic disagreements, was seen as being a 
revitalisation of Europe’s political role.  And even the British, a little earlier in the 
decade, had sought to redirect attention from the budgetary rows that they were 
perceived as having caused, by demonstrating their willingness to allow Europe 
to seize the initiative on the Middle East – a change of position that went a long 
way to permitting the Venice Declaration of 1980.  (Dab, forthcoming) Foreign 
policy advance and engagement with pressing questions of peace and 
international security, was hence being used as a mechanism to counterbalance 
internal squabbling over economics. 
In order to understand all three of these instances, it is important to recall 
the context. In the early 1980s, most West European countries felt seriously 
wrong-footed by the deterioration in relations between the two Superpowers.  
Détente may have become a dirty word in the United States, denounced by 
conservative commentators, and increasingly avoided even by Democrats, but in 
Western Europe it was still regarded as something of value.  (Njølstad, 2010; 
Young, 2010) The incentive to maximise Europe’s effectiveness in the foreign 
policy field was therefore sharpened by the increasing disjuncture between US 
and European positions on the key security issue of the era.  If Western 
European countries were to resist US pressure to impose economic and other 
sanctions on the Soviet Union in response to its invasion of Afghanistan or the 
Declaration of Martial Law in Poland, and to encourage Washington to resume 
the dialogue and negotiations with the Soviet leadership, their best chance of 
doing so appeared to be to maximise their own unity on the issue. (Patel and 
Weisbrode, 2013) The coordination of European foreign policy positions was not 
just a luxury therefore, but instead something that could contribute significantly 
to avoiding a situation in which tension between Ronald Reagan’s America and 
the Soviet Union endangered Western Europe’s own security. 
Most West European powers felt similarly disillusioned with US leadership 
over policy towards the Middle East.  Here too was an issue where Europe had 
vital interests – the region was geographically close, had traditionally been a 
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zone of European influence, and provided most of the continent’s energy 
supplies – and yet had been largely forced out of the diplomatic debate by US 
dominance. (Möckli and Mauer, 2011) Once more, therefore, the adoption of a 
common European stance – ideally backed up by coordinated European 
diplomacy – might help the Ten (in other words the then 10 members of the 
EEC) regain a voice over another issue where Europe’s own peace and security 
were very much at stake. 
This being so, the references to the preservation of peace in both the 
Genscher-Colombo plan and the Stuttgart declaration were not just window-
dressing or token references to a facet of European integration long since 
overtaken by events.  Instead, they reflected a genuine concern about the 
continent’s stability, and a hope that common action might begin to reduce the 
dangers.   
The threat to peace that needed to be addressed was external, of course, 
rather than internal.  As such, it differed significantly from the peace rhetoric of 
earlier decades, where integration had been presented as a cure for internal 
feuds and rivalries more than external threats. (Although given the Cold War 
context, the external threat had never been entirely absent.)  But the basic 
pattern of thought was similar: once again more intensive European cooperation 
was seen as both a response to a generalised sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis 
actions being primarily decided by others, and as something beneficial in its own 
right. (Di Nolfo, 1992) 
In terms of effectiveness, neither Genscher-Colombo nor the Stuttgart 
declaration achieved anything like the outcomes that their initiators had hoped 
for.   If the Superpowers turned away from the path towards confrontation upon 
which they seemed bound in the first years of the decade, this had little to do 
with Western European misgivings, individual or collective, and much more to 
do with changes within the Reagan administration and, still more importantly, 
within the Soviet leadership. (Brown, 2010; Fischer, 2010) Peace remained 
stubbornly elusive in the Middle East, meanwhile, with Europe still condemned 
to a walk-on part in the international discussions designed to address the 
region’s difficulties rather than the central role that the Ten periodically aspired 
to.(Hollis, 1997, pp. 18–19)  Nor was there much sign of a qualitative leap 
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forward in terms of European foreign policy cooperation during these years, 
despite the worthy sentiments expressed.(Gainar, 2012)  (Although I suspect 
that one of the historiographical trends of the next few years will be a gradual 
reassessment of the generally negative verdict reached on the EPC process; it 
still fell a long way short of the lofty aspirations sometimes expressed, but it 
almost certainly accomplished much more than was noticed by the press and by 
the general public at the time.) But for the purposes of this article it is not the 
effectiveness that matters.  What is important is the reminder that rhetoric about 
Europe as a peace project was still alive and well even during one of the more 
depressing moments of the integration process and the way in which this line of 
thought underlines how many of those who would later be centrally involved 
with the economically-centred relaunch in the mid-1980s retained a deeply 
political view of what Europe was and should be about. 
In the short term this search for a political or foreign policy-centred solution 
to the European Community’s difficulties did not lead at once to the hoped for 
breakthrough – indeed it arguably led many would-be saviours of the integration 
process into fruitless cul-de-sacs.  Genscher may claim in his memoirs that the 
Genscher-Colombo initiative was the first stage of a three stage European rocket, 
the second stage of which was the Single Market programme (and the third the 
Maastricht Treaty), but most analysts would be sceptical about the tangible 
outcomes of the German-Italian initiative or the direct causal link to the mid-
1980s relaunch. (Genscher, 1995, p. 368) The Stuttgart Declaration was equally 
devoid of immediate effects.  But the survival throughout the early 1980s of a 
highly political view of European integration meant that a significant number of 
those politicians and other actors who rallied behind the Single Market project 
from 1985 onwards did not just want to encourage economic liberalisation, but 
also aspired to a more generalised advance towards European unity.  This was 
true of both the French and German governments, and of the Italians and 
Benelux leaders as well, to say nothing of the European Commission.  As a result, 
they were always likely rapidly to part company from their temporary allies like 
Margaret Thatcher who genuinely saw European economic liberalisation as the 
end goal of the process.  Even at the moment when the push for economic 
integration became most determined, in other words, a substantial part of that 
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coalition that united behind the cause of economic advance were doing so as 
much for political motives as they were for economic ones.  And within this 
political vision of Europe, there persisted an enduring faith in European 
integration as a mechanism for creating and preserving European peace.  The 
ideal lived on, even if tangible results were slow to arrive. 
 
The peace ideal and the Franco-German relationship  
Such peace rhetoric remained central to the core political partnership of the 
integration process during the 1980s, namely the Franco-German relationship.   
This article is not the time or the place to launch into a lengthy exploration of 
either the pattern of Franco-German relations during the 1980s, or a discussion 
of their importance.  A substantial literature exists on both issues, emphasising 
both the degree to which France and Germany had to work hard to maintain a 
high level of cooperation and to overcome numerous disagreements and 
divergences over their European priorities, and the concrete results obtained 
when continental Western Europe’s two largest countries were able to agree. 
(Simonian, 1985) But what is more relevant to our theme is to recall how vital a 
currency, both in the internal debate between the two countries, and in the 
external justification of this most exclusive of partnerships, the theme of 
reconciliation and the redressing of past conflict remained.  In 1983, for instance, 
it is revealing that in the first meeting between a new pair of French and German 
political directors, Jacques Andréani and Franz Pfeffer, the latter chose to open 
their exchanges with an allusion back to his father, who, he claimed had been a 
major supporter of the attempted Briand-Stresemann rapprochement of the late 
1920s.(Küsters and Hofmann, 1998) Less than a year later the weight of history 
was even more apparent in the celebrated moment when Kohl and Mitterrand 
held hands at a ceremony at Verdun, designed to commemorate the most bloody 
of Franco-German battles during World War One.  Similarly the 1987 decision by 
Kohl and Mitterrand to launch a Franco-German brigade was quite deliberately 
presented as a gesture to overcome history, rather than simply a move intended 
to boost Western Europe’s military capabilities.  Former German Chancellor, 
Willy Brandt’s description of the move as ‘symbolic’ spoke volumes.  (Financial 
Times, June 25, 1987) 
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Such allusions back at France and Germany’s traumatic past still 
mattered.  They mattered to the protagonists, with the desire to overcome the 
divisions of the past, a powerful lubricant in a relationship that was seldom easy 
or natural, given the multiple differences of interest, instinct, and governmental 
tradition between the two countries.  A strong dose of idealism in other words 
was needed to keep the Franco-German show on the road – and certainly to 
make it as effective as it would prove during the 1980s. (Germond, 2012) But 
such backward references also mattered to the rest of Western Europe, in as 
much as they helped justify – even sanctify – a close bilateral relationship that 
could easily have been viewed as disruptive or damaging to a multilateral 
integration process.   
The European system after all is meant to be one in which tactical 
alliances and partnerships are constantly shifting, and where information flows 
easily and fluidly between all of those taking part.  It was hence not an 
environment in which one would normally expect to encounter so close a 
bilateral relationship as that which existed between France and Germany, nor 
one where France and Germany’s partners were so accepting of this internal 
power couple.  This is all the more so, since the British, the Benelux countries, 
and the Italians have all had periods of their history when they have felt 
threatened by the emergence of too close a link between Paris and Bonn.  The 
British had been angered in the 1960s by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s failure 
to stand up to Charles de Gaulle and to help put pressure on the French leader to 
abandon his opposition to UK membership of the EEC.  A cartoon from early 
1963 portrayed Harold Macmillan as Wellington and de Gaulle as Napoleon 
confronting one another at Waterloo, with Adenauer as Blücher heading, arms 
outstretched, towards the French leader.  The caption read ‘My God! Blucher’s 
arrived on time – but he has gone over to the enemy.’  (Jouve, 1967)Partly as a 
result, one of the early objectives of Edward Heath’s government, when it finally 
managed to negotiate its way into the EEC in 1973, was to turn the Franco-
German axis which had dominated EEC affairs, into a triangular relationship 
between London, Paris and Bonn.  This attempt met briefly with success before 
being undermined by Heath’s fall from power and the European ambivalence 
shown by the subsequent Labour government.  (Möckli, 2009) 
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Belgian and Dutch anxiety about too exclusive a Franco-German 
relationship had been an important factor in their original decision to propose a 
six country EEC. (Serra, 1989) It also resurfaced periodically during the 1960s 
and was one factor behind both countries’ enthusiasm to see Britain enter the 
Community.  (Dumoulin, 1999; Harryvan, 2009) The Italians meanwhile have 
also always been ambivalent about overly close Franco-German collaboration 
within the EEC, fearing that their exclusion from this could relegate them to a 
European second division. (Varsori, 2010) In both the 1960s and again in the late 
1980s they tried experimenting with a Rome-London axis designed to counter-
balance the links between Bonn and Paris, only to run up against a strong British 
sense that Italy was not a worthy partner in terms of status. (Ludlow, 2009) 
Despite such periodic outbursts of anxiety, however, a great deal of the 
resentment towards the Franco-German partnership that might have been 
expected on the part of other member states was stilled by a widespread 
awareness of the historical importance of this awkward Franco-German 
embrace. (de Schoutheete, 1990) It was true of course that for the Italians and 
the Benelux countries at least, such acceptance was also motivated by self-
interest and by the realisation that the European Community was most likely to 
be able to advance in the direction that both the Italians and the Benelux leaders 
wanted, if France and Germany were close rather than at loggerheads.  But extra 
potency and poignancy was added to these calculations, by the awareness of the 
symbolic importance of this very public spectacle of reconciliation, and by 
consciousness that Franco-German unity was not something that had always 
been possible to take for granted.  Given the centrality of Franco-German 
cooperation – and joint Franco-German plans – for the whole history of the 
European relance of the latter half of the 1980s, anything that lubricated this 
bilateral relationship and made it more acceptable to France and Germany’s 
other partners within the EC, was also something of importance to the wider 
process of integration.  Anthony Eden’s pithy comment that ‘on balance I had 
rather see France and Germany in a confused but close embrace, than at arm’s 
length’ made in 1952, would have applied to many subsequent Europeans 
statesmen across the latter half of the Twentieth Century.(Bullen and Pelly, 1986, 
pp. 846–847) 
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Containing German unification 
The third reminder of the enduring relevance of Europe as a peace mechanism 
arrived at the very end of the decade with the potential crisis generated by the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the rapid move to German unification, and the end of the 
Cold War.  The historiography of these events remains very superpower centred, 
despite a welcome push over the last decade or so to reassert a degree of West 
European agency – German of course, but not just German – to the end of the 
Cold War story. (Bozo et al., 2008)  But even this last still tends to focus more on 
the actions and reactions of individual Western European states, rather than on 
the European Community story of 1989 to 1990. 
It is true of course that one could interpret the 1989 interaction between 
Germany and its partners in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall as an 
illustration of how the integration process had not succeeded in embedding trust 
or mutual toleration between EC member states.  After all, the emphasis in 
Helmut Kohl’s recollections of the European Community level diplomacy of late 
1989 is placed on the ungenerous and frankly suspicious reactions that the 
German Chancellor received from his European partners.  As he puts it rather 
plaintively in his memoirs, when confronted with the reactions not just of 
Thatcher, but of the Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, the Dutch leader 
Ruud Lubbers, and even Mitterrand, he could not believe that these were the 
same people with whom he had been interacting in a friendly fashion for the last 
two decades. (Kohl, 2004, p. 1015)  The Strasbourg Council meeting of December 
1989, held in the immediate aftermath of Kohl’s ten point plan, is likewise 
described by the German leader as the most unpleasant European meeting he 
had ever attended, an occasion where he felt himself in the dock assailed by 
many of his erstwhile partners for his failure to consult, and accused of pushing 
towards unity in a reckless, even dangerous, fashion. (Kohl, 2004, p. 1011) 
It is not necessarily wise, however, to take these German lamentations 
entirely at face value.  Instead, it is worth reflecting briefly on how profound a 
shock the events of 1989 were to the balance of 1980s Western Europe, and how 
potentially dangerous the situation could be seen to be.  Perhaps the clearest 
indication of this sense of dancing close to the edge of a precipice was the sudden 
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proliferation, in both public commentary and private political exchanges of 
alarming parallels between the transformation of Germany underway and 
various earlier and darker dates in Germany’s history.  François Mitterrand is 
reported to have compared the situation to 1913, for instance, in a tête-à-tête 
conversation with Thatcher ((Salmon et al., 2009, pp. 215–9), whereas the 
Kanzleramt were particularly incensed by an opinion piece in The Times entitled 
‘Beware the Reich Resurgent’.(Schwarz, 2012, p. 557)  Equally symptomatic 
were the frequent allusions back to the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the implied 
fear that a Germany once freed from its Cold War shackles might again become a 
major threat to European peace. (Salmon et al., 2009, p. 68) 
 In the light of such alarmist talk, what is surprising is not the somewhat 
bruising exchanges between Kohl and his fellow European leaders in Strasbourg.  
Rather it is the fact that these verbal outbursts were not allowed seriously to 
disrupt either intra-European relations or the ongoing process of ever-greater 
integration.  Thus the short-term outcomes of Strasbourg were a grudging but 
real endorsement of unification, provided it happened peacefully, and the start of 
Community level efforts to prepare the EC for a transformation of its relationship 
with eastern Germany.  The European Commission was thus asked to begin to re-
visit the trade relationship with the GDR, an effort that would quickly become 
the discussion of a de facto enlargement of the European union to include the 
territory and citizens of the German Democratic Republic.  (Conclusions of the 
Presidency, European Council, Strasbourg, 8 and 9 December 1989) The months 
after Strasbourg – if not the summit itself – meanwhile saw the rapid realisation 
on the part of virtually all Western European leaders (with the solitary exception 
of Thatcher) that the best way to cope with an enlarged Germany in their midst, 
was a stronger and more integrated Europe to contain it.  By the time that Kohl 
and Mitterrand met again at Latché, the French President’s house in the country, 
in early 1990, both were in full agreement, for instance, that unification was to 
be welcomed, but that progress towards German unity needed to be 
accompanied by a rapid acceleration of the integration process also. (Küsters 
and Hofmann, 1998, pp. 682–90) 
When confronted, in other words, with a genuinely powerful external 
shock – and one that could easily have reawakened all sorts of tensions and 
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demons that had been lying quiescent for the previous decades – the reaction of 
Germany’s European neighbours was profoundly shaped first by the opportunity 
to air their misgivings and anxieties in a multilateral forum where Kohl and 
Genscher could attempt to sooth their fears, however uncomfortable and 
disconcerting for the two German leaders this experience proved.  And second 
and more importantly by the pre-existence of a flourishing integration process 
that was quickly identified as the best possible collective response to Europe’s 
new challenge. (Ludlow, 2017) 
European integration thus proved its usefulness as a mechanism for 
dousing potential internal tensions and played a highly significant role in 
enabling the rest f Europe peacefully and rapidly to accept and to come to terms 
with a huge increase in the potential power and weight of Germany.  This is 
made all the more remarkable by the many indications that Germany’s European 
partners were already anxious about the country’s growing economic dominance 
and centrality to the system even before the Wall came down.  Much of the 
debate about monetary integration for instance was fixated on the alarming 
dominance of the Deutsche Mark.(Dyson, 1994)  Such anxieties made still more 
worrying the increase in German wealth and power that unification seemed 
likely to bring, to say nothing of the greater geopolitical freedom that the Federal 
Republic would enjoy once freed from the limitations imposed upon it by its 
position as a divided, front line state in the Cold War. 
What should astonish about the European diplomacy of 1989 to 1990 is 
not therefore that Kohl and Genscher had to put up with a certain amount of 
anxiety and disquiet on the part of their fellow leaders.  Rather, it is that this 
anxiety faded so quickly and that the pre-existing pattern of intensifying 
collaboration reasserted itself so vigorously.  To take this line is not of course to 
assert that, in the absence of the integration process, Europe would have been 
plunged into outright war in 1989. This is much too far-reaching a counter-
factual speculation and one that totally ignores the multiple other factors that 
helped make Europe much less of a tinder-box in 1989 than it had been in 1913 
or 1939. These complementary stabilising factors include NATO and the US 
security guarantee, the profound alteration in attitudes towards the use force in 
most European societies and first and foremost in West Germany itself, and the 
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example of acquiescence in peaceful change being remarkably and surprisingly 
set by Gorbachev and most of his counterparts in the Eastern Bloc.(Savranskaya, 
2008)  But the fact that integration was not the only factor helping Europe ride 
out so smoothly what in another time and era could easily have been a 
profoundly disturbing external shock, should not blind us to the important role 
in calming potential fears played by the European Community structures and by 
the possibility that they offered of binding the new Germany solidly into an ever 
more unified Western Europe. 
In the early Cold War, so-called Westbindung, was a process where 
Germany’s leaders sought to bind themselves to the West so as to protect 
themselves from being drawn Eastwards and into some unstable intermediate 
position between the Blocs.  Tying the fragile new Federal Republic to the West 
through structures of multilateral cooperation was Chancellor Adenauer’s 
preferred means to ensure that neither his allies could sell West Germany out, 
concluding some sort of deal with the Soviet Union, nor his successors 
compromise the FRG’s Western alignment in the pursuit of rapid reunification. 
(Granieri, 2004) As the Cold War came to its end, the same concept was 
reinvented as a process that Germany’s partners – and Germany’s own 
government - used to bind the newly free country into the Western system and 
to prevent its new found power destabilising the whole continent.  Integration 
was as central to the Westbindung strategy in 1989-90 as it had been in the 
1950s. 
 
Exporting democracy 
One of the features of the European Community in the course of the 1970s had 
been its gradual, and almost accidental, discovery that it could play a role as a 
promoter of democracy in its near abroad. (De Angelis and Karamouzi, 2016) 
This was not a function that the Community structures had been designed for.  
Nor had there initially been unanimous agreement amongst European leaders 
that the leverage gained over neighbouring states through the EEC’s powers of 
economic attraction should be used conditionally, with the benefits of closer 
links or even full membership restricted to those states that were democratic.  In 
the early 1960s both the French and German leaderships had seemed ready to 
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establish closer ties with Franco’s Spain, although the idea had been forcibly 
criticised by the European Parliament and rejected by some left-of-centre 
politicians.  (Anaya, 2002) But in the course of the subsequent years, messily and 
unevenly, a strong consensus had gradually developed that a degree of 
democratic conditionality could and should be employed by the European 
Community, with the promise of full membership restricted to those states that 
had fully operational democratic systems.  By the late 1970s, the whole process 
of membership negotiation underway with Greece, Spain and Portugal, all three 
of which had only recently emerged from authoritarian rule, was regarded by 
both the Community institutions and the member state governments as a vital 
means of strengthening the young democracies and preventing them sliding back 
into dictatorship.  As Roy Jenkins, the Commission President, said to the Council 
of Ministers in October 1977: 
I speak first of our attitudes towards enlargement…. As you know the 
Commission believes that any reply which we might give to the candidate 
countries [Greece, Spain and Portugal] which rejected their applications, 
even implicitly or indirectly, would not be acceptable.  A straight refusal 
would be a severe blow to the fragile democratic regimes which have 
emerged with the open encouragement of the Community and which are 
already to some extent dependent on us.  Moreover any reply which, 
while pretending to be positive, tied the opening of the negotiations to 
complete solutions to problems which have long perplexed the 
Community would constitute a tacit refusal and would be so interpreted 
by the applicant countries.  (Jenkins’ statement to the Council, 18.10.1977, 
Tickell Papers, All Souls College, Oxford, File 7] 
 
Responding positively to the Greek, Spanish and Portuguese membership 
requests was thus a geopolitical imperative, a means not just of consolidating the 
three young Southern European democracies, but also of strengthening Western 
Europe’s security. 
 In order fully to appreciate the security dimension of this southern 
enlargement it is worth recalling just how acute, in the mid-1970s, the crisis of 
NATO’s ‘southern flank’ was seen as being.   With revolution in Portugal, a major 
crisis in Greece, and Franco on his death-bed in Spain, Henry Kissinger, the US 
Secretary of State had spoken in blood-curdling manner about both NATO and 
the European Community beginning to ‘unravel’ and about the huge dangers that 
would arise were communist parties to come to power in any of these vulnerable 
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states. (Del Pero, 2009, p. 23)  The United States, moreover, was in a poor 
position to respond, since it was widely discredited in the eyes of the Greek, 
Portuguese and Spanish populations for having been too close and too friendly to 
the previous authoritarian regimes.  One of the first actions of the new 
Karamanlis government in Athens following the fall of the colonels’ regime, for 
instance, was to bow to the huge levels of popular anti-American sentiment and 
to withdraw the country from NATO’s integrated military command.  
(Karamouzi, 2014, pp. 18–20)In such circumstances, European engagement, 
initially led by civil society and non-governmental actors, but rapidly followed by 
governmental overtures and the promise of closer links to the European 
Community, filled a real strategic void.(Muñoz Sánchez, 2016)  Indeed, there is 
strong evidence that the United States’ government encouraged the Europeans to 
play this stabilising role. (Karamouzi, 2011)  Thus in its own eyes, in the eyes of 
the political elites within Greece, Spain and Portugal, and in the eyes of the 
Western superpower, the European Community’s opening to southern Europe 
had become a key element in strengthening democracy, prosperity and western 
alignment in the whole region. 
 This role as promoter of stability and democracy in southern Europe had 
extended into the early 1980s.  Greece, it was true, had been admitted as a 
member state in 1981, although its western alignment still looked fragile, 
especially once the eccentric regime of Andreas Papandreou came to power.  The 
first few years of Greece’s Community experience were a testing time, for both 
Athens and the other EC member states, as the PASOK government, elected on a 
Eurosceptic platform, sought to renegotiate in all but name the conditions and 
terms of its European involvement, and to challenge multiple other features of 
Western status quo.  But with the benefit of hindsight, EC membership arguably 
helped keep Greece firmly anchored to the West, despite its government’s 
periodically alarming rhetoric and populist tendencies.  (Clogg, 1993) And Spain 
too still required a strong European anchor in the first part of the decade.  In 
February 1981 there was an abortive military coup in Madrid; and the following 
year the regime overcame another major test with a general election that 
brought the socialists to power.  In both cases, the main roots of the regime’s 
resilience were domestic. (Preston, 2001) The ongoing desire to follow the 
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Greeks into the European Community, however, also played a stabilising role.  
Spain and Portugal, it was true, were being made to wait longer for EC accession 
than almost certainly should have been the case, largely because of the stance 
towards enlargement taken by France.  (Trouvé, 2008)  But neither country ever 
seriously wavered in their determination to join, giving each a clear external 
reference point and goal during the frustrating and difficult years between 1980 
and the unblocking of the membership talks in 1984. 
 By the latter half of the decade Spain, Portugal and Greece were all inside 
the EC and in the case of the two former countries beginning to prosper 
economically, thanks in part to the influx of European investment and funding.  
The southern flank crisis seemed entirely resolved.  But unnoticed by most 
observers at the time, a new set of European neighbours were beginning to be 
deeply affected by the European Community’s success – this time, the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  How this happened is still something that we know 
too little about.  A big research project is just starting up in Florence to 
investigate the interaction between the European Community and both 
governments and dissidents in the last two decades of communist Eastern 
Europe.  
(http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/HistoryAndCivilization/Research
AndTeaching/ResearchProjects/PanEur1970s.aspx ) But it is already clear that 
the increased interaction between the two halves of the European continent that 
had been one of the great gains of détente, played a significant role in weakening 
the socialist regimes and contributing to their eventual downfall.  Even more 
than had been the case with southern Europe there was much that was 
unplanned and accidental about the Community’s engagement with Eastern 
Europe.  Nobody in Brussels seems to have set out with the intention of 
undermining the Communist bloc.  (Romano and Romero, 2014) And as with 
southern Europe much of what the Community did was merely following a trail 
of engagement blazed by non-governmental actors and by the member state 
governments. (Cerami, 2010)  Multilateral diplomacy is too slow and 
cumbersome to take a policy lead in so sensitive an area.  But by the latter half of 
the 1980s, if not earlier, there were multiple varieties of contact between the 
Community institutions and the Eastern bloc.  Indeed, in June 1988 the EC and 
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CMEA signed an umbrella agreement; the following year, the Soviet Union 
appointed its first (and only) ambassador to the European Community.  (Hanson, 
1990, p. 61) More importantly, the easier flow of information across the Iron 
Curtain ensured that both the communist governments and their internal 
opponents were well aware of the contrast between the largely stagnant 
economies of Eastern Europe and the economic boom being enjoyed by the 
European Community.  Exactly how such knowledge affected the events of 1989-
90, is largely still to determine.  But the rapidity with which the post-Communist 
governments turned their gaze towards the multilateral structures of the 
Western half of the continent and made the attainment of EC, and soon EU, 
membership one f the key priorities of their transition processes tells its own 
story.  Also significant is the rapidity with which the EC began directing money 
towards the Eastern European states.  The PHARE programme, the first of 
several schemes designed to channel money towards the transition countries, 
pre-dates the fall of the Berlin Wall albeit only by a few months.  (Financial 
Times, 1.8.1989) Similarly, the European Commission had been asked by the G7 
to oversee the allocation of aid to Eastern Europe as early as July 1989, a step 
which may well have had much to do with the US governmental hope that the 
main burden of assistance would be shouldered by the Europeans rather than by 
themselves, but which also acknowledged the rapid emergence of the EC as an 
actor in its own right in the Cold War endgame. (Hutchings, 1997, p. 69) While 
the European Community did not set out to undermine the Eastern Bloc, its 
existence and very evident success almost certainly had some impact on the 
collapse of the Communist regimes, and its gravitational pull undoubtedly 
exercised a profound influence upon the policy choices made by the new post-
Communist regimes. (Mastny, 2008) 
 
Conclusions 
On closer inspection, therefore, the 1980s are not a decade when the association 
between European integration and peace became an irrelevance in an ever more 
economically driven and motivated Europe.  Instead, a powerful vein of idealism 
about Europe’s political purpose remained, feeding into multiple abortive 
attempts to restart the integration process in the early years of the decade before 
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combining with economic factors to produce the successful relaunch from 1985 
onwards.  Political idealism and the belief that European integration was a 
means to distance Europe from its own bloody past, also served to justify in both 
the eyes of the protagonists and those of their partners the most potent bilateral 
relationship in the 1980s Community, namely that between Germany and 
France.  Without France and German cooperating as they did, and without this 
cooperation being allowed, even welcomed, by the other EC member states, the 
internal development of the European Community during this period would have 
been very different indeed. 
The Community, furthermore, continued to be a contributor to internal 
and external security during the 1980s.  The former was best illustrated by the 
way in which the EC became not only a forum within which Germany was able to 
reassure its European partners over what was happening in the months leading 
up to German unification, but also, more importantly, a mechanism the 
strengthening of which became Western Europe’s collective answer to the 
potential problems raised by a larger Germany in its midst.  For Kohl and many 
of his counterparts, more Germany could best be contained by more Europe.  It 
was therefore important that the unification story took place against the 
backdrop of a flourishing integration process, and that the plans were already 
largely in place for a large-scale acceleration of the integration process.  The 
Maastricht Treaty was not just a product of German unification or the wider 
geopolitical earthquake of 1989-1990.  Indeed, a strong case can be made that 
Western Europe was on a trajectory leading to something very much along the 
lines of the eventual Treaty on European Union even before the Berlin Wall came 
down.  (Ludlow, 2013)  But the speed with which Germany was reunited might 
well have been considerably more disruptive to Europe’s internal balance and 
stability had the integration process not offered both the German government 
itself and the majority of its European partners a ready-made and exciting 
instrument with which to respond.  Maastricht became Europe’s collective 
response to 1989-90, even if its longer-term origins have little to do with either 
German unification or the end of the Cold War. 
As far as the Community’s role in exporting security is concerned, the 
1980s saw a shift in focus from Southern to Eastern Europe.  As the decade 
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began, attention was still directed towards Greece, Spain and Portugal, where 
democratic rule remained fragile.  The Community’s capacity to help the two 
Iberian countries had admittedly been limited by the delays to membership 
imposed by the French.  But for so long as the goal remained possible – and the 
French were careful never to oppose the medium-term ambition of enlargement 
even while doing their utmost to stop it occurring in the short-term – the EC 
retained a valuable degree of leverage.   Once Spain and Portugal did belatedly 
join in 1986, moreover, they were able to benefit at once from both the return of 
generalised economic prosperity to Western Europe, and from a surge forwards 
of the integration process.  That one of the central pillars of this was a major 
increase in the sums of money that the EC was able to redistribute towards its 
poorer members helped matters still more.  Spain and Portugal both became 
major recipients of the structural funds that began to flow in the late 1980s.  By 
this time, though, the countries of Eastern Europe also were feeling the effects of 
booming Community next door.  Quite how important a factor this would turn 
out to be in the fall of the communist regimes is something that needs to be 
investigated historically in much more detail.  But what is beyond dispute is the 
power of attraction that the Community exerted over the new democratic 
regimes as soon as the communists were ousted from power.  The trajectory of 
much of Central and Eastern Europe through the 1990s and beyond, was hence 
deeply influenced by the coincidence of timing between the fall of communism 
and the highpoint of the integration process’s fortunes.  The urge to ‘return to 
Europe’ as the slogan put it was always likely to be felt as soon as Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and all the other countries threw off communist rule, but it was 
felt that much more strongly because Western Europe was flourishing 
economically and seemed headed rapidly towards greater integration.  The 
urgency of gaining access to the EC/EU rose accordingly.  And this in turn gave 
the Community/Union enormous scope to influence the direction and manner of 
the transition processes across the region.  The transformation of Central and 
Eastern Europe is primarily a story associated with the 1990s and the first years 
of the 21st century.  But even before the 1980s had come to an end, it was already 
becoming more likely that change would occur and that the European 
Community would be closely involved with this change.  
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